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Abstract This	  paper	  investigates	  the	  effect	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  quality-­‐related	  variables	  pertaining	  to	  the	  reliability	  of	  airlines,	  such	  as	  cancellation	  status	  and	  diverted	  status,	  and	  the	  timeliness	  of	  airlines,	  such	  as	  flight	  time	  and	  arrival	  delay.	  When	  implementing	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model,	  the	  effects	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  reliability	  are	  statistically	  insignificant.	  Route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  affects	  average	  arrival	  delay	  but	  not	  average	  flight	  time.	  Route-­‐specific	  market	  share’s	  effect	  on	  both	  measurements	  of	  timeliness,	  however,	  is	  significant	  and	  U-­‐shaped.	  That	  is,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  significant	  weather	  conditions,	  firms	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  market	  share	  experience	  decreases	  in	  average	  arrival	  delay	  and	  average	  flight	  time	  as	  their	  market	  share	  increases,	  but	  as	  market	  share	  passes	  a	  threshold,	  increases	  in	  an	  airline’s	  market	  share	  begin	  to	  increase	  average	  arrival	  delay	  and	  average	  flight	  time.	  	  When	  weather	  conditions	  become	  problematic,	  this	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  inverts,	  and	  increases	  in	  market	  share	  harm	  the	  timeliness	  of	  small	  firms.	  After	  a	  relatively	  large	  market	  share	  is	  attained,	  these	  increases	  in	  market	  share	  become	  beneficial	  for	  timeliness	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  adverse	  weather.	  
 
Introduction Capital-­‐intensive	  industries	  tend	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  oligopolistic	  fashion.	  The	  need	  for	  large	  amounts	  of	  capital	  impedes	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  firms	  into	  the	  industry	  and	  bestows	  the	  few	  firms	  that	  operate	  in	  the	  market	  with	  substantial	  market	  shares.	  Airline	  providers,	  due	  to	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  business	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  natural	  efficiencies,	  enjoy	  considerable	  market	  share	  and	  operate	  within	  an	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oligopolistic	  market	  structure	  (Rubin,	  2005).	  This	  paper	  investigates	  how	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  of	  an	  air	  carrier	  affects	  consumer	  welfare	  through	  the	  quality	  of	  airline	  service	  provided	  on	  that	  route.	  	  This	  question	  is	  pertinent	  because	  a	  firm’s	  profit-­‐optimizing	  amount	  of	  quality	  might	  depend	  on	  their	  market	  share.	  Just	  as	  firms	  with	  market	  power	  can	  raise	  prices	  when	  competition	  is	  scarce,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  firms	  with	  significant	  market	  share	  can	  sacrifice	  the	  quality	  that	  they	  provide	  to	  the	  customer	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  costs.	  This	  research	  proposes	  that	  air	  carriers	  with	  low	  market	  shares	  will	  provide	  higher	  levels	  of	  quality	  as	  their	  market	  share	  increases.	  Small	  firms	  that	  want	  to	  attract	  patrons	  will	  need	  to	  offer	  high	  levels	  of	  quality	  in	  order	  to	  divert	  business	  away	  from	  larger	  firms	  and	  will	  have	  more	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  as	  they	  experience	  the	  natural	  efficiencies	  of	  having	  larger	  market	  shares.	  	  	  Once	  a	  firm	  passes	  a	  certain	  threshold,	  however,	  market	  share	  might	  start	  to	  decrease	  the	  quality	  of	  air	  carrier	  service	  because	  competitive	  pressure	  to	  supply	  high	  quality	  service	  will	  diminish,	  and	  consumers	  will	  have	  fewer	  options	  to	  choose	  from.	  	  	  When	  considering	  the	  timeliness	  and	  reliability	  of	  an	  airline,	  as	  this	  study	  does,	  many	  might	  ask	  how	  cost-­‐cutting	  measures	  would	  result	  in	  the	  deterioration	  of	  these	  quality-­‐related	  variables.	  The	  channel	  through	  which	  this	  paper	  expects	  cost	  cutting	  measures	  to	  deteriorate	  these	  measures	  of	  quality	  is	  a	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  capital	  and	  labor.	  For	  instance,	  when	  an	  airline	  decides	  how	  many	  fuel	  trucks	  they	  need	  at	  a	  given	  airport,	  how	  many	  laborers	  they	  need	  to	  hire	  for	  loading	  and	  unloading	  planes,	  or	  how	  to	  allocate	  those	  resources	  among	  simultaneous	  flights	  to	  different	  destinations,	  they	  must	  weigh	  the	  costs	  of	  an	  additional	  truck	  or	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an	  additional	  baggage	  handler	  against	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  that	  additional	  unit	  of	  capital	  or	  labor.	  They	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  prioritizing	  flights	  that	  take	  off	  at	  similar	  times.	  	  One	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  more	  trucks	  or	  laborers	  would	  be	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  an	  airline	  could	  prepare	  its	  planes	  for	  flight.	  The	  timeliness	  and	  reliability	  of	  air	  travel	  is	  important	  to	  consumers	  and	  airlines	  alike.	  On-­‐time	  planes	  contribute	  to	  the	  coherence	  of	  an	  airline’s	  schedule,	  and	  consumers	  prefer	  to	  be	  on	  time	  so	  they	  can	  adhere	  to	  their	  own	  schedules.	  Pleasing	  the	  customers	  in	  this	  way	  helps	  ensure	  their	  continued	  business.	  In	  competitive	  markets,	  where	  consumers	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  choices,	  we	  would	  expect	  timeliness	  and	  reliability	  to	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  customer	  retention	  because	  a	  disgruntled	  customer	  could	  choose	  to	  fly	  with	  another	  airline	  on	  their	  next	  business	  trip	  or	  family	  vacation.	  Markets	  that	  are	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  or	  at	  least	  one	  large	  firm,	  however,	  provide	  fewer	  options	  to	  consumers,	  so	  a	  customer	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  change	  their	  air	  carrier	  despite	  having	  a	  bad	  experience	  with	  their	  current	  one.	  	  Therefore,	  firms	  with	  small	  market	  shares	  or	  firms	  in	  competitive	  markets	  might	  decide	  to	  make	  that	  extra	  investment	  in	  capital	  or	  labor	  while	  firms	  that	  dominate	  the	  market	  that	  they	  operate	  in	  might	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  that	  investment.	  That	  is,	  we	  would	  expect	  airlines	  with	  high	  market	  shares	  or	  airlines	  that	  operate	  in	  concentrated	  markets	  to	  cut	  costs,	  with	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  degradation	  of	  timeliness	  and	  reliability.	  Airlines	  with	  low	  market	  shares	  or	  airlines	  that	  operate	  in	  relatively	  dilute	  markets	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  these	  investments	  because	  customer	  retention	  is	  a	  bigger	  worry	  for	  these	  airlines.	  It	  is	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likely	  that	  firms	  that	  dominate	  a	  market	  will	  have	  larger	  total	  investments	  in	  these	  production	  inputs,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  their	  investment	  per	  unit	  flight	  is	  smaller	  and	  consequently,	  their	  provided	  quality	  is	  inferior.	  	  	  
Literature Review When	  competition	  is	  introduced	  into	  a	  market,	  prices	  for	  goods	  in	  that	  market	  tend	  to	  decrease.	  Although	  low-­‐cost	  carrier	  competition	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  airfares,	  legacy	  carrier	  competition	  tends	  to	  have	  little	  influence	  on	  airfares	  (Brueckner	  et	  al,	  2013a).	  	  Airlines	  are	  quick	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  price	  changes	  of	  competitors,	  and	  customers	  frequently	  end	  up	  making	  decisions	  about	  their	  air	  carrier	  by	  considering	  the	  amenities	  of	  the	  air	  carrier	  such	  as	  frequent	  flyer	  programs,	  food	  service,	  arrival	  delay,	  and	  other	  various	  metrics	  for	  quality	  (Jones	  and	  Sasser,	  1995;	  Chen	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Chang	  et	  al,	  2002).	  	  	  Airline	  studies	  find	  that	  the	  quality	  provided	  by	  an	  air	  carrier	  affects	  the	  consumption	  decisions,	  customer	  retention,	  and	  participation	  of	  consumers	  in	  the	  market	  (Jones	  and	  Sasser,	  1995;	  Chen	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Chang	  et	  al,	  2002).	  Air	  carriers	  can	  benefit	  from	  adjusting	  the	  quality	  of	  service	  that	  they	  provide	  in	  order	  to	  optimize	  profits,	  and	  their	  profit-­‐maximizing	  amount	  of	  quality	  might	  depend	  on	  their	  dominance	  of	  the	  market.	  	  	  	  Airport-­‐pair	  market	  share	  is	  found	  to	  be	  especially	  impactful	  on	  the	  price-­‐based	  decisions	  that	  an	  airline	  makes	  (Jones	  and	  Sasser,	  1995;	  Brueckner	  et	  al,	  2013b).	  If	  a	  carrier’s	  airport-­‐pair	  market	  share	  can	  influence	  their	  ability	  to	  vary	  prices,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  an	  airline’s	  ability	  to	  degrade	  quality	  without	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losing	  as	  many	  patrons	  is	  also	  affected	  by	  their	  market	  share.	  	  An	  “airport-­‐pair”	  market	  is	  one	  that	  considers	  flights	  between	  airport	  A	  and	  airport	  B,	  regardless	  of	  direction,	  to	  be	  a	  single	  market.	  So	  if	  firm	  i	  controls	  5	  flights	  between	  airport	  A	  and	  airport	  B,	  and	  there	  are	  10	  total	  flights	  between	  airport	  A	  and	  airport	  B,	  firm	  i	  has	  a	  fifty	  percent	  airport-­‐pair	  market	  share.	  In	  Brueckner	  et	  al	  (2013b),	  airport-­‐pair	  market	  shares	  are	  considered	  on	  a	  quarterly	  basis.	  	  Suzuki	  et	  al	  (1999)	  regress	  a	  firm’s	  market	  share	  on	  their	  quality-­‐based	  consumer	  welfare	  index.	  They	  find	  that	  losses	  in	  quality	  cause	  a	  statistically	  significant	  decrease	  in	  market	  share	  for	  that	  firm	  while	  quality	  gains	  are	  found	  to	  have	  no	  statistical	  effect	  on	  market	  share	  (Suzuki	  et	  al,	  1999).	  Since	  these	  flight	  schedules	  are	  determined	  far	  in	  advance	  of	  any	  realized	  weather	  delays,	  reverse	  causation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  problem	  for	  this	  study,	  but	  Suzuki	  et	  al	  (1999)	  may	  indicate	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  firm’s	  flights,	  or	  specifically	  a	  lack	  thereof,	  may	  have	  future	  implications	  for	  the	  market	  share	  of	  that	  firm.	  	  Therefore,	  Suzuki	  et	  al	  indicates	  that	  route-­‐dominant	  firms	  in	  particular	  might	  not	  want	  to	  degrade	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  service	  even	  if	  they	  have	  substantial	  market	  share.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  degradation	  in	  quality	  could	  result	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  market	  share.	  If	  firms	  know	  these	  effects	  and	  take	  them	  into	  account,	  predicting	  their	  decision-­‐making	  becomes	  difficult.	  Air	  carriers	  with	  greater	  market	  shares,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  competitive	  pressure,	  might	  have	  a	  lower	  profit-­‐maximizing	  amount	  of	  quality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  effects	  that	  Suzuki	  et	  al	  (1999)	  discuss	  could	  be	  strong	  enough	  that	  airlines	  with	  already	  large	  market	  shares	  might	  make	  more	  profits	  by	  not	  reducing	  quality.	  Also	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  natural	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efficiency,	  that	  benefits	  these	  measurements	  of	  quality,	  might	  be	  positively	  associated	  with	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share.	  Theoretically,	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  share	  on	  quality	  is	  ambiguous.	  Chen	  and	  Gayle	  (2013)	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Continental/United	  and	  Delta/Northwest	  airlines	  mergers	  on	  quality.	  Their	  particular	  measurement	  of	  quality,	  what	  they	  call	  routing	  quality,	  considers	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  get	  a	  passenger	  from	  their	  origin	  airport	  to	  their	  final	  destination.	  The	  study	  uses	  the	  distance	  between	  airports	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  flight	  time	  such	  that	  a	  non-­‐stop	  flight	  would	  represent	  the	  shortest	  possible	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  get	  from	  the	  origin	  to	  the	  destination.	  Itineraries	  that	  include	  layovers	  are	  accounted	  for	  by	  considering	  the	  distance,	  relative	  to	  the	  non-­‐stop	  distance,	  between	  the	  origin	  airport,	  all	  of	  the	  hub	  airports,	  and	  the	  final	  destination	  for	  a	  given	  flight.	  Using	  distance	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  travel	  time	  is	  effective	  because	  longer	  distances	  will	  take	  longer	  times	  to	  traverse.	  	  Chen	  and	  Gayle	  (2013)	  conclude	  that	  if	  the	  two	  firms	  were	  competing	  in	  the	  same	  market	  prior	  to	  the	  merge,	  their	  merge	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  quality	  decrease.	  If	  they	  were	  not	  competing	  in	  the	  same	  market	  prior	  to	  the	  merge,	  their	  merge	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  quality	  increase.	  These	  results	  highlight	  two	  competing	  effects	  outlined	  by	  Chen	  and	  Gayle	  (2013)	  in	  their	  theoretical	  model:	  the	  coordination	  and	  incentive	  effects.	  The	  coordination	  effects	  are	  the	  efficiencies	  that	  are	  experienced	  when	  merging	  firms	  share	  technologies,	  information,	  and	  coordinate	  production.	  The	  incentive	  effect	  eliminates	  the	  competitive	  pressure	  on	  firms	  to	  provided	  high-­‐quality	  service.	  Consequently,	  these	  two	  effects	  work	  against	  each	  other.	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Although	  this	  study	  investigates	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  share,	  not	  mergers,	  on	  quality,	  the	  results	  of	  Chen	  and	  Gayle	  (2013)	  indicate	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  competitive	  pressure,	  a	  luxury	  of	  firms	  with	  high	  market	  shares,	  could	  result	  in	  quality	  losses.	  While	  the	  coordination	  effect	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  this	  study,	  it	  indicates	  some	  sort	  of	  natural	  efficiency	  that	  accompanies	  mergers.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  those	  natural	  efficiencies	  might	  also	  be	  present	  when	  firms	  have	  large	  market	  shares.	  	  Literature	  on	  the	  audit	  industry	  investigates	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  concentration	  on	  quality.	  Francis	  et	  al	  (2013)	  perform	  a	  cross-­‐country	  comparison	  on	  the	  market	  structure	  of	  the	  audit	  industry	  and	  audit	  quality.	  	  They	  consider	  two	  measures	  of	  market	  concentration	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  same	  specification,	  and	  the	  two	  measures	  of	  market	  concentration	  have	  opposing	  effects	  on	  audit	  quality.	  Using	  a	  Herfindahl	  Index	  (HHI)	  to	  calculate	  market	  concentration	  based	  on	  the	  total	  sales	  of	  the	  four	  largest	  firms,	  they	  find	  that	  countries	  whose	  audit	  industries	  had	  higher	  Herfindahl	  Indices	  have	  generally	  inferior	  audit	  outcomes	  (Francis	  et	  al,	  2013).	  The	  other	  measure	  calculates	  the	  proportion	  of	  companies	  that	  use	  one	  of	  the	  four	  largest	  firms	  in	  a	  given	  country.	  With	  this	  measurement,	  higher	  market	  concentrations	  were	  found	  to	  increase	  audit	  quality	  (Francis	  et	  al,	  2013).	  	  	  Since	  the	  HHI	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  quality	  and	  accounts	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  market	  among	  the	  top	  four	  firms,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  countries	  with	  one	  or	  two	  dominant	  audit	  firms	  could	  suffer	  quality	  losses,	  but	  some	  sort	  of	  concentration	  of	  business	  among	  four	  firms	  might	  be	  beneficial	  for	  audit	  quality	  as	  a	  whole.	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There	  may	  be	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  and	  not	  just	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  of	  a	  firm,	  affects	  the	  quality	  of	  service	  provided	  by	  airlines	  in	  that	  market.	  	  Market	  concentration	  captures	  the	  environment	  that	  the	  firm	  operates	  in	  and	  not	  just	  that	  firm’s	  standing	  in	  the	  market.	  For	  instance,	  an	  airline	  with	  40%	  of	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  will	  make	  different	  decisions	  in	  markets	  where	  only	  one	  competitor	  controls	  the	  other	  60%	  of	  the	  market	  than	  it	  would	  in	  markets	  where	  six	  other	  firms	  each	  control	  10%	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  research	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  considering	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  air	  carrier	  service.	  Specifically,	  this	  paper	  will	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  two	  variables	  on	  arrival	  delay,	  flight	  time,	  diverted	  status,	  and	  cancellation	  status.	  
 
Data 	   This	  study	  utilizes	  data	  on	  domestic	  flights	  from	  2009	  to	  2013	  provided	  by	  the	  Research	  and	  Innovative	  Technology	  Administration	  (RITA).	  The	  dataset	  includes	  nearly	  every	  domestic	  flight	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  RITA	  provides	  the	  following	  relevant	  variables	  for	  each	  flight:	  arrival	  delay,	  cancellation	  status,	  diverted	  status,	  flight	  time,	  delay	  due	  to	  weather,	  the	  origin	  airport	  of	  the	  flight,	  the	  destination	  airport	  of	  the	  flight,	  the	  airline	  that	  provided	  the	  flight,	  and	  the	  date	  of	  the	  flight.	  	  	   Variables	  are	  measured	  in	  accordance	  with	  several	  guidelines.	  Cancelled	  flights	  are	  scheduled	  to	  fly	  but	  never	  take	  off,	  and	  flights	  are	  generally	  cancelled	  due	  to	  mechanical	  or	  weather-­‐related	  problems.	  Flights	  are	  considered	  diverted	  if	  they	  land	  at	  an	  airport	  other	  than	  the	  originally	  scheduled	  destination	  airport.	  Diverted	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flights	  can	  be	  diverted	  prior	  to	  take	  off,	  but	  if	  there	  are	  weather,	  mechanical,	  or	  fuel-­‐related	  problems	  after	  take	  off,	  they	  can	  be	  diverted	  mid-­‐flight.	  Flight	  time	  is	  the	  time	  that	  passes	  between	  take-­‐off	  from	  the	  origin	  airport	  and	  landing	  at	  the	  destination	  airport.	  Arrival	  delay	  is	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  scheduled	  arrival	  time	  and	  the	  actual	  arrival	  time.	  Although	  this	  paper’s	  definition	  of	  a	  market	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  city-­‐pair	  definition,	  it	  varies	  slightly.	  This	  paper	  utilizes	  the	  term	  “route-­‐specific”	  because,	  when	  calculating	  market	  share,	  it	  considers	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  flights	  from	  airport	  A	  to	  airport	  B	  that	  a	  firm	  offers	  in	  a	  day	  separate	  from	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  flights	  from	  airport	  B	  to	  airport	  A	  that	  a	  firm	  offers	  in	  a	  day.	  The	  city-­‐pair	  approach	  considers	  these	  two	  markets	  as	  one.	  This	  route-­‐specific	  measurement	  may	  capture	  nuances	  between	  how	  firms	  operate	  differently	  when	  providing	  flights	  in	  different	  directions	  and	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  market	  definition	  implemented	  by	  Chen	  and	  Gayle	  (2013).	  	  Additionally,	  the	  decision	  to	  consider	  markets	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  instead	  of	  a	  quarterly	  basis	  is	  based	  off	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  firm’s	  decision	  or	  ability	  to	  provide	  quality	  service	  may	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  day.	  This	  consideration	  of	  the	  market	  share	  on	  a	  day	  may	  better	  reflect	  the	  decisions	  a	  firm	  has	  to	  make	  about	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  allocating	  capital	  and	  labor	  between	  different	  flights	  in	  a	  day	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  exogenous	  factors	  such	  as	  weather	  delays.	  Also	  market	  concentrations	  in	  a	  given	  day	  may	  better	  capture	  the	  effect	  of	  congestion	  due	  to	  low	  market	  concentration.	  	   For	  further	  reference,	  in	  this	  study,	  a	  “route-­‐day”	  market	  refers	  to	  the	  market	  for	  a	  given	  route	  on	  a	  given	  day	  while	  “route-­‐day”	  market	  concentration	  refers	  to	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the	  market	  concentration	  for	  a	  given	  route	  on	  a	  given	  day.	  	  A	  “route-­‐day-­‐firm”	  is	  an	  observation	  in	  this	  data	  set	  and	  denotes	  all	  of	  the	  flights	  for	  a	  given	  route	  that	  an	  individual	  firm	  provides	  on	  a	  day.	  The	  metrics	  utilized	  in	  this	  study	  are	  averaged	  by	  route-­‐day-­‐firms.	  Each	  of	  these	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  corresponds	  to	  a	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  a	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  and	  the	  various	  average	  metrics.	  “Small	  airlines”	  are	  airlines	  with	  relatively	  small	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  and	  “large	  airlines”	  are	  airlines	  with	  relatively	  large	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares.	  In	  order	  to	  attain	  some	  measure	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  subsequently,	  route-­‐specific	  market	  concentration,	  this	  study	  counts	  the	  number	  of	  flights	  that	  each	  airline	  provides	  for	  a	  given	  route	  on	  a	  given	  day,	  Nirt,	  and	  the	  total	  number	  of	  flights	  that	  are	  offered	  for	  that	  route	  in	  that	  day,	  Nrt.	  The	  Market	  Share	  of	  airline	  i	  for	  route	  r	  in	  day	  t,	  MSirt,	  is	  the	  quotient	  (Nirt/Nrt).	  This	  study	  then	  calculates	  the	  Herfindahl	  Index,	  the	  measurement	  of	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  by	  summing	  the	  market	  share	  squared	  for	  each	  route-­‐day.	  That	  is,	  HHIrt=∑i=1(MSirt)2.	  Then,	  all	  of	  the	  various	  metrics	  are	  averaged	  by	  route-­‐day-­‐firm.	  This	  yields	  route-­‐day–firm	  averages	  of	  arrival	  delay,	  weather	  delay,	  and	  flight	  time.	  Also,	  this	  averaging	  results	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  cancelled	  or	  diverted	  for	  that	  route-­‐day-­‐firm.	  	  The	  maximum	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  of	  a	  market	  given	  that	  a	  firm	  with	  a	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  of	  θ,	  where	  0≤θ≤1,	  operates	  in	  that	  market	  is	  θ2+(1-­‐θ)2.	  That	  is,	  one	  competing	  firm	  controls	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  market.	  The	  minimum	  possible	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  given	  that	  a	  firm	  with	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  θ	  operates	  in	  that	  market,	  is	  θ2+𝜺	  where	  𝜺=∑i=1(1/N2)	  from	  1	  to	  (N-­‐
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Nθ)	  and	  N	  is	  the	  number	  of	  flights	  on	  that	  route	  in	  that	  day.	  That	  is,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  the	  market	  each	  provide	  exactly	  one	  flight	  for	  that	  route-­‐day	  market.	  	  These	  maximums	  and	  minimums	  are	  visible	  in	  the	  following	  graph.	  Data	  points	  only	  exist	  for	  a	  countable	  number	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  because	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  is	  an	  inherently	  discrete	  variable.	  If	  there	  are	  N	  flights	  for	  a	  given	  route	  on	  a	  given	  day,	  all	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  will	  be	  in	  the	  form	  (1/N)*K	  where	  0≤K≤N.	  	  When	  limiting	  our	  market	  to	  a	  day	  measurement,	  N	  will	  not	  be	  large	  enough	  to	  seem	  continuous.	  
  
Graph 1: Variation in Market Share and Market Concentration1 
	  
As	  indicated	  by	  the	  preceding	  graph,	  a	  variety	  of	  combinations	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  Points	  that	  lie	  on	  the	  U-­‐Shaped	  curve	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  plot	  represent	  all	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  that	  compete	  with	  only	  one	  competitor	  in	  their	  route-­‐day	  market.	  The	  points	  on	  the	  contour	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  plot	  represent	  all	  of	  the	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  that	  operate	  in	  route-­‐day	  markets	  with	  many	  flights	  and	  face	  competitors	  that	  control	  about	  one	  flight	  each	  in	  a	  route-­‐day	  market.	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sample.	  These	  aforementioned	  maximum	  and	  minimum	  market	  concentrations,	  and	  many	  market	  concentrations	  in-­‐between,	  are	  well	  represented	  in	  the	  data	  for	  many	  levels	  of	  market	  share.	  	  Table	  1	  illustrates	  the	  composition	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  in	  these	  five	  years	  of	  data.	  	  	  	  	  








cumulative %  
0 < Market Share ≤ .1 184,253 0.0180 0.0180 
.1 < Market Share ≤ .25 1,378,115 0.1349 0.1530 
.25 < Market Share ≤.5 2,410,262 0.2360 0.3890 
.5 < Market Share ≤ .75 1,095,518 0.1073 0.4962 
.75 < Market Share < 1 270,522 0.0265 0.5227 
Market Share=1 4,874,336 0.4773 1.0000 	  	   Roughly	  48%	  of	  the	  firms	  for	  a	  given	  route-­‐day-­‐firm	  are	  the	  only	  airline	  serving	  a	  given	  market.	  That	  means	  that	  more	  than	  48%	  of	  route-­‐day	  markets	  are	  served	  by	  only	  a	  single	  airline.	  Although	  many	  firms	  have	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  of	  1,	  only	  2.65%	  of	  firms	  have	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  between	  .75	  and	  1.	  Approximately	  24%	  of	  market	  shares	  in	  this	  data	  set	  are	  between	  .25	  and	  .5.	  	  The	  least	  common	  range	  of	  market	  shares	  is	  between	  0	  and	  .1,	  but	  this	  is	  also	  the	  smallest	  interval	  in	  consideration,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  represented	  by	  almost	  185,000	  observations.	  	  	  Although	  the	  distribution	  of	  market	  shares	  is	  weighted	  heavily	  towards	  1,	  market	  shares	  of	  all	  sizes	  are	  relatively	  well	  represented	  in	  this	  dataset.	  	  	   Another	  variable	  in	  this	  data	  that	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  is	  the	  average	  delay	  due	  to	  weather.	  	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  controlling	  for	  weather,	  this	  study	  should	  show	  that	  weather	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  arrival	  delays.	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Weather Delay=0 9,959,335 0.9754 0.9754 
0<Weather Delay≤15 172,056 0.0169 0.9922 
15<Weather Delay≤30 40,160 0.0039 0.9961 
30< Weather Delay≤60 24,577 0.0024 0.9985 
60<Weather Delay≤120 10,881 0.0011 0.9996 
120<Weather Delay≤240 3,268 0.0003 0.9999 
Weather Delay>240 678 0.0001 1.0000 	  
	   Table	  2	  illustrates	  the	  frequency	  of	  weather	  delays	  measured	  in	  minutes.	  	  253,671	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  suffer	  arrival	  delays	  due	  to	  weather	  conditions.	  79,564	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  are	  affected	  by	  weather	  delays	  of	  an	  average	  of	  15	  or	  more	  minutes.	  While	  97.54%	  of	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  experience	  no	  average	  delay	  due	  to	  weather,	  some	  weather	  delays	  are	  incredibly	  extreme.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  unless	  the	  arrival	  delay	  of	  a	  given	  individual	  flight	  is	  greater	  than	  fifteen	  minutes,	  no	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  delay	  happens	  is	  given	  in	  the	  data.	  So	  for	  individual	  flights,	  prior	  to	  averaging,	  arrival	  delays	  of	  less	  than	  15	  minutes	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  weather	  delay	  components	  of	  0.	  	  
Methodology 	   The	  two	  measurements	  for	  reliability	  in	  this	  study	  are	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  serving	  a	  particular	  route	  that	  were	  diverted	  and	  the	  proportion	  that	  were	  cancelled	  by	  an	  individual	  firm	  in	  a	  given	  day.	  	  The	  two	  relevant	  metrics	  for	  timeliness	  are	  the	  average	  flight	  time	  and	  average	  arrival	  delay	  of	  flights	  for	  a	  route-­‐firm-­‐day.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  complete	  explanation	  for	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  this	  study	  implements	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model.	  The	  model	  includes	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  year,	  month,	  day	  of	  the	  week,	  airline,	  and	  route.	  Route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  squared,	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  route-­‐day	  market	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concentration	  squared,	  and	  the	  average	  delay	  due	  to	  weather	  for	  that	  route-­‐firm-­‐day	  are	  all	  controls	  and	  variables	  of	  interest.	  	  	  	   The	  average	  delay	  due	  to	  weather	  is	  an	  important	  control	  because	  it	  is	  unquestionably	  correlated	  with	  the	  average	  total	  arrival	  delay	  and	  is	  likely	  correlated	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  diverted	  and	  average	  flight	  time.	  Also,	  as	  the	  previous	  section	  indicated,	  some	  of	  these	  average	  weather	  delays,	  while	  infrequent,	  are	  substantially	  large.	  Weather	  delays	  factor	  directly	  into	  total	  delay	  measurements.	  For	  the	  diverted	  status	  and	  average	  flight	  time	  regressions,	  weather	  delays	  serve	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  weather	  conditions	  at	  the	  time	  of	  flight.	  	  Weather	  conditions	  presumably	  affect	  cancellations,	  but	  since	  cancelled	  flights	  do	  not	  ever	  arrive	  at	  their	  destination,	  they	  have	  no	  associated	  weather	  delay	  to	  use	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  weather	  conditions.	  	  These	  delays	  due	  to	  weather	  are,	  by	  definition,	  not	  a	  result	  of	  a	  firm’s	  market	  share,	  so	  by	  controlling	  for	  them,	  this	  study	  is	  controlling	  for	  exogenous	  factors	  that	  could	  affect	  the	  reliability	  or	  timeliness	  of	  a	  firm’s	  flights.	  Additionally,	  firms	  with	  higher	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  might	  be	  affected	  more	  by	  bad	  weather	  that	  occurs	  on	  that	  day	  in	  between	  the	  origin	  and	  destination	  airports,	  so	  the	  weather	  delay	  controls	  account	  for	  potential	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  as	  well.	  	  	  This	  study	  implements	  the	  following	  specification	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  service	  provided	  for	  that	  route	  by	  that	  firm	  on	  a	  given	  day.	  Subscripts	  i,r,	  and	  t	  represent	  firm-­‐specific,	  route-­‐specific,	  and	  day-­‐specific	  variables	  respectively,	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so	  variables	  with	  subscript	  irt	  are	  route-­‐day-­‐firm	  level	  variables	  and	  variables	  with	  a	  subscript	  of	  rt	  are	  route-­‐day	  level	  variables.	  	  Specification:	  	  Yirt	  =	  β1MSirt	  +	  β2	  (MSirt)2	  +	  β3HHIrt	  +	  β4(HHIrt)2	  +	  β5WDirt	  +	  β6WDirt×	  MSirt	  	  +	  β7WDirt×	  (MSirt)2	  	  +	  αD(t)	  +	  ɣM(t)	  +	  δY(t)	  +	  ζr	  +Ɩi	  	   Yirt,	  represents	  the	  four	  quality	  variables	  of	  interest:	  the	  average	  arrival	  delay	  of	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm,	  the	  average	  flight	  time	  of	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm,	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  diverted	  in	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm,	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  cancelled	  in	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm.	  MSirt,	  HHIrt,	  and	  WDirt	  are	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  the	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  and	  the	  average	  weather	  delay	  of	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm	  respectively.	  For	  the	  regression	  on	  cancellation	  status,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  weather	  delay	  term	  and	  the	  weather	  delay	  interaction	  terms	  are	  not	  present	  in	  the	  cancellation	  specification.	  αD(t)	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  day	  of	  the	  week,	  ɣM(t)	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  month,	  δY(t)	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  year,	  ζr	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  route,	  and	  Ɩi	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  air	  carrier.	  	  A	  quadratic	  term	  for	  market	  share	  is	  present	  in	  all	  of	  the	  specifications	  because	  an	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  may	  not	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  quality	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  market	  share.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  we	  expect	  firms	  with	  large	  market	  shares	  to	  sacrifice	  quality	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  costs.	  Firms	  with	  initially	  low	  levels	  of	  market	  shares,	  however,	  might	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  higher	  levels	  of	  quality	  as	  their	  market	  share	  increases	  because	  they	  want	  to	  attract	  more	  customers,	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  extra	  capital	  and	  labor	  might	  be	  greater	  when	  they	  are	  providing	  more	  flights.	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Although	  the	  intuition	  for	  including	  a	  quadratic	  market	  concentration	  variable	  is	  less	  obvious	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  airline	  industry,	  the	  aforementioned	  study	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  concentration	  on	  audit	  outcomes	  influence	  this	  paper	  to	  include	  the	  quadratic.	  There	  are	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  results	  of	  Francis	  et	  al	  (2013)	  when	  considering	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  market	  concentrations.	  While	  they	  do	  consider	  HHI	  as	  one	  of	  those	  measurements,	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  HHI	  squared	  in	  their	  specification.	  The	  results	  between	  their	  two	  measurements	  might	  be	  more	  concurrent	  if	  they	  did.	  Furthermore,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  more	  complex	  effect	  that	  a	  quadratic	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  term	  might	  capture.	  For	  the	  average	  arrival	  delay,	  average	  flight	  time,	  and	  diverted	  status	  regressions,	  delay	  due	  to	  weather	  interacts	  with	  market	  share	  and	  market	  share	  squared	  in	  order	  to	  see	  how	  an	  airline’s	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  weather	  is	  affected	  by	  their	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share.2	  
Results 
Table 3: Cancellation Status 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Market Share -0.00269 
  (-0.0024) 
Market Share Squared 0.00124 
  (-0.00252) 
Market Concentration 0.000635 
  (-0.00112) 
Market Concentration Squared -0.00137 
  (-0.00165) 
Observations 1.02E+07 
Number of Routes 5762 
R-squared 0.006 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  following	  interaction	  terms	  were	  initially	  included	  in	  the	  study	  but	  were	  found	  to	  be	  highly	  insignificant	  in	  each	  specification:	  MSirt	  *	  HHIrt,	  (MSirt)2	  *	  HHIrt,	  MSirt	  *	  (HHIirt)2	  and	  (MSirt)2*	  (HHIirt)2	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Table	  4:Diverted Status	  
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Market Share -0.000745 
  (-0.0006) 
Market Share Squared 0.000631 
  (-0.0007) 
Market Concentration -0.00019 
  (-0.0003) 
Market Concentration Squared 0.000052 
  (-0.0004) 
Weather Delay -0.0000415*** 
  (-0.000005) 
Market Share * Weather Delay 0.000201*** 
  (-0.00003) 
Market Share Squared * Weather Delay -0.000144*** 
  (-0.00003) 
Observations 1.02E+07 
Number of Routes 5762 
R-squared 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
	   Tables	  3	  and	  4	  contain	  the	  regression	  output	  for	  cancellation	  status	  and	  diverted	  status	  respectively.	  	  The	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  of	  an	  air	  carrier	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  do	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  air	  carrier	  diverted	  a	  flight	  through	  another	  airport	  or	  cancelled	  the	  flight	  completely.	  	  For	  the	  diversion	  regression,	  it	  seems	  that	  weather	  delay	  and	  the	  interaction	  terms	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  diverting	  a	  flight	  or	  cancelling	  a	  flight	  is	  so	  detrimental	  to	  customer	  retention	  and	  the	  schedule	  of	  the	  airline	  itself	  that	  airlines	  of	  all	  sizes	  in	  all	  types	  of	  route-­‐day	  markets	  avoid	  cancelling	  or	  diverting	  flights	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  That	  is,	  when	  considering	  costs	  and	  customer	  retention,	  the	  profit	  maximizing	  number	  of	  cancellations	  and	  diversions	  is	  neither	  dependent	  on	  market	  share	  nor	  market	  concentration.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  main	  determinants	  of	  a	  flight	  being	  cancelled	  are	  exogenous	  factors	  like	  mechanical	  failures,	  bad	  weather,	  or	  general	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safety	  concerns.	  While	  average	  weather	  delay	  and	  the	  interaction	  models	  are	  statistically	  significant,	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  are	  still	  not	  economically	  substantial,	  especially	  when	  considering	  that	  weather	  delays,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  previous	  descriptive	  statistics,	  are	  relatively	  infrequent.3	  	  
Table 5: Average Flight Time 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Market Share -1.482*** 
  (-0.509) 
Market Share Squared 1.072** 
  (-0.541) 
Market Concentration 0.166 
  (-0.232) 
Market Concentration Squared -0.251 
  (-0.359) 
Weather Delay 0.00637 
  (-0.0041) 
Market Share * Weather Delay 0.0879*** 
  (-0.0188) 
Market Share Squared * Weather Delay -0.0700*** 
  (-0.0154) 
Observations 1.01E+07 
Number of Routes 5662 
R-squared 0.025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   	   Table	  5	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  the	  average	  flight	  time	  regression.	  Market	  concentration	  and	  market	  concentration	  squared	  do	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  average	  flight	  time.	  Market	  share	  squared	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  five	  percent	  level	  and	  the	  linear	  market	  share	  term	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  one	  percent	  level.	  The	  weather	  delay	  interaction	  models	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  one	  percent	  level.	  The	  fact	  that	  market	  concentration	  has	  no	  statistical	  effect	  on	  average	  flight	  time	  is	  not	  particularly	  surprising.	  Once	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Appendix	  Grid	  1	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plane	  is	  up	  in	  the	  air,	  we	  would	  not	  expect	  the	  market	  concentration	  of	  the	  route	  to	  significantly	  affect	  its	  ability	  to	  fly	  at	  a	  normal	  pace.	  	  All	  planes	  flying	  into	  the	  destination	  airport	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  a	  flight’s	  ability	  to	  land	  quickly,	  but	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  variable.	  	  
Grid 1: The Effect of a 10% Point Increase in Market Share 
on Average Flight Time 
MS/WD 0 15 30 45 60 75 
0.1 -0.127 -0.01591 0.095 0.206 0.317 0.427 
0.25 -0.095 -0.01525 0.064 0.143 0.223 0.302 
0.5 -0.041 -0.01415 0.013 0.040 0.066 0.093 
0.75 0.0126 -0.01305 -0.039 -0.064 -0.090 -0.116 	  Grid	  1	  displays	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  on	  average	  flight	  time.	  	  Since	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  change	  in	  market	  share	  on	  flight	  time	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  current	  level	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  (MS)	  and	  average	  weather	  delay	  (WD).	  This	  table	  assumes	  various	  levels	  of	  market	  share,	  on	  the	  y-­‐axis,	  and	  weather	  delay,	  on	  the	  x-­‐axis.	  As	  indicated	  by	  the	  grid	  above	  and	  the	  coefficients	  on	  market	  share	  and	  market	  share	  squared	  in	  Table	  5,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  weather	  delays,	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  decreases	  average	  flight	  times	  for	  smaller	  firms,	  but	  for	  firms	  with	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  larger	  than	  about	  70%4,	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  results	  in	  longer	  average	  flight	  times.	  	  	  	  This	  result	  agrees	  with	  the	  theory	  stated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  There	  may	  be	  some	  investment	  decision	  about	  labor	  that	  could	  cause	  this	  discrepancy.	  Smaller	  firms	  may	  make	  more	  investments	  in	  capital	  and	  labor	  per	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  Appendix	  Graph	  1	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flight	  as	  their	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  increases	  because	  they	  feel	  more	  pressured	  to	  provide	  higher	  levels	  of	  quality	  and	  have	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  due	  to	  some	  natural	  efficiency.	  As	  firms	  begin	  to	  dominate	  the	  route-­‐day	  market,	  and	  the	  competitive	  pressure	  decreases,	  their	  investment	  in	  capital	  and	  labor	  per	  flight	  may	  decrease	  because	  customer	  retention	  becomes	  less	  of	  an	  issue	  and	  cutting	  costs	  will	  increase	  profits	  but	  also	  decrease	  quality.	  Additionally,	  the	  natural	  efficiencies	  gained	  with	  increasing	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  might	  be	  smaller	  at	  these	  large	  levels	  of	  market	  share.	  	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  average	  weather	  delays	  of	  fifteen	  minutes,	  a	  relatively	  benign	  average	  weather	  delay,	  all	  firms	  will	  fly	  faster	  as	  they	  gain	  more	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  but	  smaller	  firms	  will	  still	  benefit	  the	  most.	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  relatively	  mild	  weather,	  natural	  efficiencies	  outweigh	  any	  lack	  of	  competitive	  pressure	  throughout	  the	  range	  of	  market	  share	  or	  customer	  retention	  is	  a	  bigger	  issue	  when	  weather	  conditions	  are	  bad	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  weather	  delays	  is	  higher.	  	  	  Grid	  1	  indicates	  that	  the	  U-­‐shaped	  effect	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  inverts	  itself	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  weather	  delays	  greater	  than	  thirty	  minutes.	  	  When	  controlling	  for	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration,	  as	  small	  firms	  get	  larger,	  their	  average	  flight	  times	  go	  up.	  	  	  As	  firms	  attain	  a	  market	  share	  of	  about	  60%5	  (depending	  on	  the	  weather	  delay	  in	  question),	  an	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  actually	  decreases	  a	  firm’s	  average	  flight	  time	  again.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Appendix	  Graph	  1	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These	  results	  do	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  theory	  of	  this	  paper,	  and	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  this	  first	  half	  of	  this	  inverse	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  is	  elusive	  when	  considering	  average	  weather	  delay	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  weather	  conditions.	  Consider	  one	  firm	  that	  has	  a	  larger	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  than	  another	  firm	  that	  operates	  in	  the	  same	  route-­‐day	  market.	  Now	  consider	  adverse	  weather	  conditions	  on	  that	  day,	  and	  suppose	  that	  those	  conditions	  only	  last	  for	  a	  few	  hours	  that	  day.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  flights	  provided	  by	  the	  firm	  with	  a	  larger	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  would	  be	  more	  adversely	  affected	  by	  this	  weather	  delay	  because	  they	  have	  more	  flights	  flying	  on	  that	  day,	  so	  their	  flights	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  coincide	  with	  that	  period	  of	  less	  than	  ideal	  weather.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  smaller	  firms’	  flights	  happen	  to	  coincide	  with	  this	  period	  of	  bad	  weather,	  their	  average	  weather	  delay	  is	  more	  adversely	  affected	  because	  they	  have	  fewer	  total	  flights	  during	  that	  day.	  Since	  an	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  is	  initially	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  flight	  time,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  first	  explanation	  is	  more	  likely,	  that	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  larger	  average	  weather	  delay	  goes	  up	  with	  the	  number	  of	  flights	  that	  an	  airline	  provides	  on	  a	  route-­‐day,	  and	  more	  flights	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  higher	  market	  shares.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  inverse	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  natural	  efficiencies	  that	  come	  with	  high	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares.	  For	  instance,	  firms	  with	  higher	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  may	  have	  pilots	  that	  have	  flown	  the	  route	  in	  question	  more	  frequently	  than	  routes	  with	  smaller	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares.	  This	  could	  result	  in	  these	  pilots	  having	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  fly	  and	  land	  in	  bad	  weather	  conditions	  because	  they	  are	  more	  experienced	  with	  the	  route	  and	  the	  runway	  they	  are	  landing	  on.	  Also,	  these	  firms	  with	  larger	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route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  may	  also	  have	  more	  seasoned	  landing-­‐essential	  personnel	  or	  may	  possibly	  reallocate	  more	  personnel	  to	  routes	  that	  are	  experiencing	  weather	  problems.	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  indicated	  by	  Table	  6,	  the	  effects	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  average	  arrival	  delay	  are	  more	  pronounced	  than	  the	  effects	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  or	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  on	  any	  other	  quality	  variable	  investigated	  in	  this	  study.	  All	  non-­‐fixed	  effect	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  one	  percent	  level	  except	  for	  the	  market	  concentration	  variable,	  which	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  five	  percent	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table 6: Average Arrival Delay 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Market Share -5.694*** 
  (-1.239) 
Market Share Squared 5.392*** 
  (-1.35) 
Market Concentration 1.404** 
  (-0.579) 
Market Concentration Squared -2.389*** 
  (-0.905) 
Weather Delay 0.948*** 
  (-0.0285) 
Market Share * Weather Delay 1.773*** 
  (-0.134) 
Market Share Squared * Weather Delay -1.367*** 
  (-0.114) 
Observations 1.01E+07 
Number of Routes 5662 
R-squared 0.086 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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  Grid	  2	  displays	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  on	  average	  arrival	  delay.	  	  Since	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  change	  in	  market	  share	  on	  average	  arrival	  delay	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  current	  level	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  average	  weather	  delay,	  this	  table	  assumes	  various	  levels	  of	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  (MS),	  on	  the	  y-­‐axis,	  and	  average	  weather	  delay	  (WD),	  on	  the	  x-­‐axis.	  As	  indicated	  by	  Grid	  2	  and	  the	  coefficients	  on	  market	  share	  and	  market	  share	  squared	  presented	  by	  Table	  6,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  weather	  delay,	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  decreases	  average	  arrival	  delay	  for	  smaller	  firms,	  but	  for	  firms	  with	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  of	  52.80%6	  or	  more,	  a	  ten	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  results	  in	  longer	  average	  flight	  times.	  	  	  Like	  the	  results	  for	  average	  flight	  time,	  these	  results	  for	  average	  arrival	  delay	  suggest	  a	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  established	  by	  this	  paper.	  Both	  investments	  in	  capital	  and	  investments	  in	  labor	  could	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  arrival	  delay	  because	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  the	  plane	  is	  prepared	  prior	  to	  departure	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  arrival	  delay	  as	  does	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  the	  plane	  flies.	  For	  instance,	  smaller	  firms	  may	  feel	  more	  pressured	  to	  provide	  more	  fuel	  trucks,	  baggage	  handlers,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  Appendix	  Graph	  2	  
Grid 2: The Effect of a 10% Point Increase in Market Share 
on Average Arrival Delay 
MS/WD 0 15 30 45 60 75 
0.1 -0.462 1.788 4.037 6.287 8.536 10.785 
0.25 -0.3 1.334 2.969 4.603 6.237 7.871 
0.5 -0.03 0.579 1.188 1.797 2.406 3.015 
0.75 0.239 -0.177 -0.593 -1.009 -1.426 -1.842 
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landing/	  take	  off	  essential	  personnel	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  customers	  where	  as	  larger	  firms	  will	  not	  be	  as	  pressured	  to	  do	  so	  because	  patrons	  in	  their	  route-­‐day	  market	  will	  have	  fewer	  choices.	  	  When	  weather	  delays	  of	  fifteen	  minutes	  or	  more	  are	  considered,	  however,	  the	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  inverts	  itself	  once	  again.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  weather	  delays	  greater	  than	  15	  minutes,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  of	  small	  airlines	  results	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  average	  arrival	  delay.	  When	  firms	  have	  about	  68%7	  (depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  Weather	  Delay)	  of	  the	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  increases	  in	  market	  share	  begin	  to	  decrease	  their	  average	  arrival	  time	  again.	  	  Intuition	  would	  suggest	  that	  firms	  that	  have	  the	  most	  flights	  operating	  on	  a	  given	  route	  might	  have	  the	  largest	  problems	  recuperating	  from	  bad	  weather	  because	  they	  would	  have	  more	  flights	  affected	  by	  the	  route,	  and	  the	  delay	  of	  earlier	  flights	  might	  affect	  flights	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  day.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  true	  up	  until	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  market	  share	  is	  attained.	  	  After	  that	  threshold,	  however,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  those	  firms	  with	  larger	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  have	  more	  resources	  dedicated	  to	  those	  routes	  or	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  reallocate	  resources	  to	  those	  routes	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  larger	  weather	  delays.	  For	  instance,	  when	  there	  are	  weather-­‐related	  delays,	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  divert	  another	  plane	  to	  serve	  that	  route	  and	  have	  more	  pilots	  on	  call	  to	  fly	  that	  extra	  plane.	  Also	  pilots	  who	  are	  employed	  by	  these	  dominant	  firms	  probably	  fly	  the	  route	  more	  often,	  and	  could	  possibly	  have	  more	  experience	  flying	  in	  bad	  weather	  conditions.	  Consequently	  they	  can	  outperform	  the	  pilots	  who	  fly	  for	  less	  route-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  Appendix	  Graph	  2	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dominant	  airlines.	  	  It	  could	  be	  that	  these	  route-­‐dominant	  airlines	  only	  take	  these	  extra	  steps	  when	  weather	  is	  an	  issue	  and	  not	  otherwise	  because	  the	  threat	  of	  losing	  customers	  is	  higher	  in	  these	  circumstances.	  
Table 7: The Effect of a 10% Increase 
in Market Concentration on Arrival 
Delay 
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Conclusions Route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  and	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentration	  seem	  to	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  an	  airline	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  diverted	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  cancelled	  for	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  weather	  delays,	  both	  measurements	  of	  timeliness	  decrease	  as	  firms	  with	  relatively	  low	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  experience	  an	  increase	  in	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  but	  once	  that	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  reaches	  a	  certain	  threshold,	  subsequent	  increases	  in	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  increase	  average	  flight	  time	  and	  average	  arrival	  delay.	  This	  could	  reflect	  a	  threshold	  where	  a	  lack	  of	  competitive	  pressure	  overcomes	  the	  natural	  efficiencies	  that	  accompany	  higher	  market	  shares,	  and	  larger	  firms	  stop	  making	  the	  decisions	  to	  provide	  as	  much	  capital	  or	  labor	  per	  flight	  that	  affects	  these	  measures	  of	  timeliness.	  	  While	  the	  inverted	  U-­‐shape	  results	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  weather	  delays	  are	  interesting,	  only	  2.46%	  of	  route-­‐day-­‐firms	  from	  2009	  to	  2013	  experienced	  any	  weather	  delays	  at	  all,	  and	  1.69%	  of	  those	  average	  weather	  delays	  were	  less	  than	  15	  minutes	  long.	  So	  while	  firms	  with	  market	  shares	  in	  the	  range	  of	  anywhere	  from	  55%-­‐70%8	  are	  the	  least	  timely	  in	  the	  face	  of	  bad	  weather	  conditions,	  they	  are	  the	  most	  timely	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  adverse	  weather	  conditions9,	  and	  since	  weather	  delays	  are	  relatively	  infrequent,	  firms	  with	  market	  shares	  of	  these	  levels	  are	  probably	  more	  efficient	  overall.	  	  While	  market	  concentration	  did	  not	  affect	  flight	  time,	  it	  does	  affect	  arrival	  delay,	  and	  that	  makes	  sense.	  Market	  congestion	  probably	  does	  not	  affect	  a	  plane	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Appendix	  Graphs	  1	  &	  2	  9	  See	  Appendix	  Graphs	  1	  &	  2	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flight,	  but	  it	  could	  very	  well	  affect	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  plane	  to	  take	  off	  on	  time,	  and	  this	  would	  affect	  arrival	  delay.	  Relatively	  high	  route-­‐day	  market	  concentrations	  seem	  to	  be	  beneficial,	  but	  only	  when	  controlling	  for	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share,	  so	  policy	  makers	  need	  to	  consider	  a	  balance	  of	  market	  concentration	  and	  market	  share	  when	  implementing	  policy.	  
 
Limitations and Further Studies Like	  many	  studies	  in	  an	  economics,	  and	  academia	  in	  general,	  this	  study	  could	  be	  built	  upon,	  improved,	  or	  modified.	  The	  theory	  that	  firms	  with	  larger	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  can	  allocate	  more	  labor	  and	  capital	  in	  the	  face	  of	  bad	  weather	  conditions	  could	  be	  supported	  by	  studies	  that	  see	  if	  firms	  who	  have	  large	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares	  also	  tend	  to	  control	  more	  flights	  at	  the	  origin	  or	  destination	  airport.	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  believable	  that	  these	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  their	  market	  share	  at	  an	  airport	  they	  dominate	  in	  order	  to	  reallocate	  more	  resources	  to	  flights	  that	  may	  be	  troubled	  by	  weather	  on	  their	  journey.	  This	  would	  also	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  their	  potentially	  larger	  amount	  of	  labor	  and	  capital	  would	  be	  spread	  thin	  relative	  to	  firms	  with	  smaller	  route-­‐specific	  market	  shares.	  While	  the	  weather	  delay	  term	  and	  the	  weather	  delay	  interaction	  terms	  are	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper,	  due	  to	  the	  infrequent	  nature	  of	  weather-­‐related	  arrival	  delays,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  account	  for	  the	  number	  of	  flights	  that	  a	  route-­‐day-­‐firm	  provides.	  Controlling	  for	  this	  may	  affect	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  weather	  delay	  interaction	  terms.	  Also	  seeing	  how	  many	  flights	  are	  provided	  at	  each	  level	  of	  market	  share	  would	  be	  interesting.	  If	  firms	  with	  market	  shares	  of	  1	  tend	  to	  provide	  relatively	  fewer	  flights	  when	  compared	  with	  firms	  with	  market	  shares	  of	  .5	  or	  .6,	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then	  the	  tapering	  of	  the	  inverted	  U-­‐shaped	  curve	  at	  high	  levels	  of	  market	  share	  could	  be	  explained	  not	  by	  not	  only	  natural	  efficiencies,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  frequency	  of	  flights.	  	  Also	  this	  study	  could	  utilize	  the	  airport-­‐pair	  approach.	  A	  large	  amount	  of	  literature	  considers	  the	  flights	  that	  go	  between	  two	  airports,	  regardless	  of	  direction,	  as	  a	  definition	  for	  a	  market.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  the	  airport-­‐pair	  approach	  may	  not	  capture	  any	  effects	  on	  quality	  that	  are	  dependent	  on	  direction.	  An	  analysis	  comparing	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  firms	  in	  these	  two	  directions	  and	  the	  quality	  that	  they	  offer	  would	  inform	  which	  definition	  is	  more	  appropriate.	  When	  considering	  the	  different	  directions,	  if	  market	  shares	  and	  quality	  are	  relatively	  symmetric	  for	  a	  given	  airport-­‐pair,	  then	  airport-­‐pair	  approach	  may	  be	  more	  suitable.	  This	  route-­‐specific	  method,	  however,	  would	  still	  capture	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  market	  shares	  on	  quality.	  	  Another	  topic	  that	  could	  be	  explored,	  in	  the	  vein	  of	  Suzuki	  et	  al	  (1999),	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  route-­‐day-­‐firm	  measurements	  of	  quality	  on	  an	  airline’s	  future	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share.	  Just	  as	  a	  firm’s	  route-­‐specific	  market	  share	  can	  influence	  the	  quality	  that	  an	  airline	  provides,	  the	  quality	  that	  a	  firm	  provides	  could	  influence	  a	  customer’s	  decision	  to	  continue	  flying	  with	  that	  airline	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	   Finally,	  many	  major	  cities	  in	  America	  have	  more	  than	  one	  airport.	  As	  Brueckner	  et	  al	  (2013b)	  discusses,	  markets	  can	  be	  described	  as	  city-­‐pairs	  or	  airport-­‐pairs.	  Accounting	  for	  regional	  airport	  competition	  would	  improve	  this	  study	  by	  accounting	  for	  spillover	  effects	  from	  one	  airport	  to	  another.	  Brueckner	  et	  al	  (2013b)	  identifies	  some	  metropolitan	  regions	  that	  could	  be	  reasonably	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  location.	  Alternatively,	  as	  in	  Brueckner	  et	  al	  (2013a),	  a	  variable	  could	  be	  utilized	  in	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Appendix 
	  
Appendix Grid 1: The Effect of a 10% Point Increase in Market Share on Flight 
Time10 
MS/WD 0 15 30 45 60 75 
0.1 -0.000062 0.000196 0.000455 0.000713 0.000971 0.001230 
0.25 -0.000043 0.000151 0.000344 0.000538 0.000731 0.000925 
0.5 -0.000011 0.000074 0.000160 0.000245 0.000331 0.000416 
0.75 0.000020 -0.000002 -0.000025 -0.000047 -0.000070 -0.000092 
	  
	  
Appendix Graph 1: The Effect of a 10% Increase in Market 
Share on Flight Time  
Weather Delays Market Share 10% increase  Threshold 
0 0.1 -0.127 
0 0.25 -0.095 
0 0.5 -0.041 
0 0.75 0.013 
0.6912 
15 0.1 -0.016 
15 0.25 -0.015 
15 0.5 -0.014 
15 0.75 -0.013 
3.7159 
30 0.1 0.095 
30 0.25 0.064 
30 0.5 0.013 
30 0.75 -0.039 
0.5618 
45 0.1 0.206 
45 0.25 0.143 
45 0.5 0.040 
45 0.75 -0.064 
0.5952 
60 0.1 0.317 
60 0.25 0.223 
60 0.5 0.066 
60 0.75 -0.090 
0.6061 
75 0.1 0.427 
75 0.25 0.302 
75 0.5 0.093 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  mean	  proportion	  of	  flights	  that	  were	  diverted	  in	  this	  data	  is	  .00258,	  so	  only	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  most	  extreme	  weather	  delays	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  on	  the	  proportion	  of	  flights	  diverted	  substantial,	  but	  delays	  greater	  than	  60	  minutes	  are	  so	  rare	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  probably	  not	  economically	  significant.	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Appendix Graph 2: The Effect of a 10% Increase in Market  
Weather Delays Market Share 10% increase 2 Threshold 
0 0.1 -0.462 
0 0.25 -0.300 
0 0.5 -0.030 
0 0.75 0.239 
0.5280 
15 0.1 1.788 
15 0.25 1.334 
15 0.5 0.579 
15 0.75 -0.177 
0.6915 
30 0.1 4.037 
30 0.25 2.969 
30 0.5 1.188 
30 0.75 -0.593 
0.6667 
45 0.1 6.287 
45 0.25 4.603 
45 0.5 1.797 
45 0.75 -1.009 
0.6601 
60 0.1 8.536 
60 0.25 6.237 
60 0.5 2.406 
60 0.75 -1.426 
0.6570 
75 0.1 10.785 
75 0.25 7.871 
75 0.5 3.015 
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